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Abstract. Because risks are on all sides of social situations, it is not possible to be 
“precautionary” in general. The availability heuristic ensures that some risks stand out as 
particularly salient, whatever their actual magnitude. Taken together with intuitive cost-
benefit balancing, the availability heuristic helps to explain differences across groups, 
cultures, and even nations in the assessment of precautions to reduce the risks associated 
with climate change. There are complex links among availability, social processes for the 
spreading of information, and predispositions. If the United States is to take a stronger 
stand against climate change, it is likely to be a result of available incidents that seem to 
show that climate change produces serious and tangible harm. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“Many Germans believe that drinking water after eating cherries is deadly; they 
also believe that putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The English, however, rather 
enjoy a cold drink of water after some cherries; and Americans love icy refreshments” 
(Henrich et al., 2001). 
 
  “The most important factor contributing to the increased stringency of health, 
safety and environmental regulation in Europe has been a series of regulatory failures and 
crises that placed new regulatory issues on the political agenda and pressured policy 
makers to adopt more risk averse or precautionary policies. . . . The regulatory failure 
associated with BSE significantly affected the attitude of the European public toward GM 
foods. . . . Consumer and environmental regulations are likely to become more 
innovative, comprehensive and risk averse as a response to a widespread public 
perception of regulatory failures” (Vogel, 2003). Precautions against What? 
2 
It has become standard to say that with respect to risks, Europe and the United 
States can be distinguished along a single axis: Europe accepts the Precautionary 
Principle, and the United States does not. On this view, Europeans attempt to build a 
“margin of safety” into public decisions, taking care to protect citizens against risks that 
cannot be established with certainty. By contrast, Americans are reluctant to take 
precautions, requiring clear evidence of harm in order to justify regulation. These claims 
seem plausible in light of the fact that the United States appears comparatively 
unconcerned about the risks associated with climate change and genetic modification of 
food; in those contexts, Europeans favor precautions, whereas Americans seem to require 
something akin of proof of danger. To be sure, the matter is quite different in the context 
of threats to national security. For the war in Iraq, the United States (and England) 
followed a kind of Precautionary Principle, whereas other nations (most notably France 
and Germany) wanted clearer proof of danger. But for most threats to safety and health, 
and for climate change in particular, many people believe that Europe is precautionary 
and the United States is not. 
But this opposition between Europe and America is false, even illusory (Wiener 
and Rogers, 2002). It is simply wrong to say that Europeans are, in general, more 
precautionary than Americans. As an empirical matter, neither is “more precautionary.” 
Europeans are not more averse to risks than Americans. They are more averse to 
particular risks, perhaps most prominently the risks associated with climate change; but 
Americans have their own preoccupations as well. No nation can, even in principle, 
commit itself to precaution as such (Sunstein, 2005; Sunstein 2003a). The real problem 
with the Precautionary Principle, at least in its strongest forms, is that it is incoherent. It 
purports to give guidance, but it fails to do so, because it condemns the very steps that it 
requires. The reason is simple: Precautions always give rise to risks of their own. 
As a starting point, it is reasonable to think that judgments about precautions will 
be based on a form of intuitive cost-benefit balancing. If the costs of precautions are high, 
they are less likely to be appealing; so too if the benefit are low. This point applies to 
climate change as to all other problems, and it helps to explain the massive differences 
between the United States and Europe with respect to that topic. In addition, the 
availability heuristic is often the source of people’s fears about certain risks (Rohrmann Precautions against What? 
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and Renn, 2000).
1 If a particular risk is cognitively “available”—both vivid and salient—
then people will have a heightened fear of the risk in question. If people in one nation 
fear the risks associated with climate change, and people in another nation fear the risks 
associated with terrorism, the availability heuristic is likely to be the reason. But this 
point misses some complexities, about intuitive cost-benefit balancing, social influences 
and cultural predispositions; I shall turn to these in due course. The availability heuristic 
does not operate in a social or cultural vacuum. 
In short, I suggest that cross-cultural differences in both risk perception and in 
precautions are produced, in large part, by availability, which operates in the context of 
social influences and intuitive attention to both costs and benefits. In the context of 
climate change, many Americans believe that far more would be lost than gained by 
extensive precautions; in Europe, the opposite is true. It is important, for example, that 
the risks associated with climate change are not salient to most Americans; it is important 
as well that efforts to control greenhouse gases would impose unusually high burdens on 
the United States. These points bear directly on cross-cultural differences with respect to 
climate change. If the United States will ultimately show more concern about the risks 
associated with climate change, it is likely to be a product of a shift in intuitive cost-
benefit balancing—with available incidents, apparently linking climate change to serious 
harm, playing a large role.  
 
2. The Mirage of Precaution 
 
Despite its formal enthusiasm for the Precautionary Principle, European nations 
are not “more precautionary” than the United States. Simply as a logical matter, societies, 
like individuals, cannot be highly precautionary with respect to all risks. Each society and 
each person must select certain risks for special attention. In these respects, the selectivity 
of precautions is not merely an empirical fact; it is a conceptual inevitability. Comparing 
Europe to the United States, Wiener and Rogers (2002) demonstrate this point 
empirically. In the early twenty-first century, for example, the United States appears to 
                                                 
1 Undoubtedly a great deal can be learned from use of the psychometric paradigm, stressed in 
Rohrmann and Renn (2000, p. 17-18). I stress the availability heuristic here because of its comparative 
simplicity, but the heuristic interacts in complex ways with psychometrics and with culture; I try at least to 
scratch some of the surfaces. Precautions against What? 
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take a highly precautionary approach to the risks associated with abandoned hazardous 
waste dumps and terrorism, but not to take a highly precautionary approach to the risks 
associated with climate change, indoor air pollution, poverty, poor diet, and obesity. It 
would be most valuable to attempt to see which nations are especially precautionary with 
respect to which risks, and also to explore changes over time.  
A nation-by-nation study commissioned by the German Federal Environmental 
Agency goes so far as to conclude that there are two separate camps in the industrialized 
world: “precaution countries” (Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United 
States) and “protection countries” (Japan, France, and the United Kingdom) (Sand, 2000, 
p. 448). But this conclusion is ludicrously implausible. The universe of risks is far too 
large to permit categorizations of this kind. The most general point is that no nation is 
precautionary in general and costly precautions are inevitably taken against only those 
hazards that seem especially salient or insistent. The problem with the idea of precaution, 
and any general Precautionary Principle, is that it wrongly suggests that nations can and 
should adopt a general form of risk aversion (Sunstein, 2005). 
 
3. The Availability Heuristic 
 
I suggest that the Precautionary Principle becomes operational if and only if those 
who apply it wear blinders—only, that is, if they focus on some aspects of the regulatory 
situation but downplay or disregard others. But this suggestion simply raises an 
additional question: What accounts for the particular blinders that underlie applications of 
the Precautionary Principle? What people’s attention is selective, why is it selective in the 
way that it is? Part of the answer, I contend, lies in an understanding of behavioral 
economics and cognitive psychology, which provide important clues to cross-cultural 
differences in risk perception, in a way that much bears on social judgments about 
climate change. The availability heuristic is the place to start. 
3.1. Availability in action. It is well-established that in thinking about risks, 
people rely on certain heuristics, or rules of thumb, which serve to simplify their inquiry 
(Kahneman et al., 1982). Heuristics typically work through a process of “attribute 
substitution,” in which people answer a hard question by substituting an easier one 
(Kahneman and Frederick, p. 53). Should we be fearful of climate change? When people Precautions against What? 
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use the availability heuristic, they assess the magnitude of risks by asking whether 
examples of harm can readily be brought to mind (Tverksy and Kahneman, 2002, pp. 11-
14). If people can easily think of such examples, they are far more likely to be frightened 
than if they cannot. The availability heuristic illuminates the operation of the 
Precautionary Principle, by showing why some hazards will be on-screen and why others 
will be neglected. The availability heuristic also tells us a great deal about differences in 
risk perceptions across groups, cultures, and even nations. 
For example, “a class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear more 
numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable” (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 2002, p. 11). Consider a simple study showing people a list of well-
known people of both sexes, and asking them whether the list contains more names of 
women or more names of men. In lists in which the men were especially famous, people 
thought that they were more names of men, whereas in lists in which the women were the 
more famous, people thought that there were more names of women (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 2002). 
This is a point about how familiarity can affect the availability of instances. A risk 
that is familiar, like that associated with terrorism, will be seen as more serious than a 
risk that is less familiar, like that associated with sun-bathing. But salience is important as 
well. “For example, the impact of seeing a house burning on the subjective probability of 
such accidents is probably greater than the impact of reading about a fire in the local 
paper” (Tversky and Kahneman, 2002). The point helps explain differences across time 
and space in much risk-related behavior, including decisions to take precautions. Whether 
people will buy insurance for natural disasters is greatly affected by recent experiences 
(Slovic, 2000, p. 40). If floods have not occurred in the immediate past, people who live 
on flood plains are far less likely to purchase insurance. In the aftermath of an 
earthquake, insurance for earthquakes rises sharply—but it declines steadily from that 
point, as vivid memories recede. Note that the use of the availability heuristic, in these 
contexts, is hardly irrational.
2 Both insurance and precautionary measures can be 
                                                 
2 Tversky and Kahneman (1986) emphasize that the heuristics they identify “are highly economical 
and usually effective,” but also that they “lead to systematic and predictable errors.” Gerd Gigerenzer, 
among others, has emphasized that some heuristics can work extremely well (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; 
Gigerenzer, 2000), and used this point as a rejoinder to those who stress the errors introduced by heuristics Precautions against What? 
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expensive, and what has happened before seems, much of the time, to be the best 
available guide to what will happen again. The problem is that the availability heuristic 
can lead to serious errors, in terms of both excessive fear and neglect. 
What, in particular, produces availability? An intriguing essay attempts to test the 
effects of ease of imagery on perceived judgments of risk (Sherman et al., 2002). The 
study asked subjects to read about an illness (Hyposcenia-B) that “was becoming 
increasingly prevalent” on the local campus. In one condition, the symptoms were 
concrete and easy to imagine—involving muscle aches, low energy, and frequent severe 
headaches. In another condition, the symptoms were vague and hard to imagine, 
involving an inflamed liver, a malfunctioning nervous system, and a general sense of 
disorientation. Subjects in both conditions were asked to imagine a three-week period in 
which they had the disease and to write a detailed description of what they imagined. 
After doing so, subjects were asked to assess, on a ten-point scale, their likelihood of 
contracting the disease. The basic finding was that likelihood judgments were very 
different in the two conditions, with easily-imagined symptoms making people far more 
inclined to believe that they were likely to get the disease.  
3.2. Availability and cross-national risk perceptions in general. The availability 
heuristic helps to explains the operation of the Precautionary Principle and cross-national 
differences for a simple reason: Sometimes a certain risk, said to call for precautions, is 
cognitively available, whereas other risks, including those associated with regulation 
itself, are not. In many cases where the Precautionary Principle seems to offer guidance, 
the reason is that some of the relevant risks are available while others are barely visible. 
Differences across nations, in the perception of risks, have a great deal to do with the 
operation of the availability heuristic. I shall turn to climate change shortly; for the 
moment, let us explore the hypothesis more generally. 
The study of cross-cultural risk perceptions remains in its infancy (Renn and 
Rohrmann, 2000), and hence my claim must remain only a hypothesis, one that I cannot 
establish to be true. What is necessary, and what is lacking, is anything like 
comprehensive information about cross-cultural risk perceptions, allowing us to test the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and biases. I do not mean to take a stand on the resulting debates. Even if many heuristics mostly work well 
in daily life, a sensible government can do much better than to rely on them. Precautions against What? 
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role of availability. And we shall shortly see some complexities that bear on the adequacy 
of the availability hypothesis. But for now, consider some supportive evidence: 
•  Within the United States, public concern about risks usually does track changes in 
the actual fluctuations in those risks. But public concern outruns actual 
fluctuations in the important case of “panics,” bred by vivid illustrations that do 
not reflect changes in levels of danger (Loewenstein and Mather, 1990). At 
certain points in the 1970s and 1980s, there were extreme leaps in concern about 
teenage suicides, herpes, illegitimacy, and AIDS—leaps that did not correspond 
to changes in the size of the problem. Availability, produced by “a particularly 
vivid case or new finding that receives considerable media attention,” played a 
major role in those leaps in public concern (Loewenstein and Mather, 1990, p. 
172). Sometimes the concern led to unjustified precautions, as in the behavior of 
some parents who refused to allow their children to attend classes having students 
with signs of herpes. 
•  What accounts for people’s perception of their risk of being infected with HIV? 
Why are some people and some groups largely unconcerned about that risk, while 
other people and groups are highly focused on with it? A study of rural Kenya and 
Malawi suggests that availability plays a critical role (Behrman et al., 2003). The 
authors find that risk perception is a product of discussions that “are often 
provoked by observing or hearing about an illness or death” (Behrman et al., 
2003, p. 10) People “know in the abstract how HIV is transmitted and how it can 
be prevented,” but they are unclear “about the advisability and effectiveness of 
the changes in sexual behavior that are recommended by experts” (Behrman et al., 
2003, p. 18). Perceptions of the risk of HIV transition are very much a function of 
social networks, with pronounced changes in belief and behavior resulting from 
interactions with other people expressing a high level of concern. The effects of 
social networks are thus asymmetric, with substantial effects from having “at least 
one network partner who is perceived to have a great deal of concern about 
AIDS.” The authors do not refer explicitly to the availability heuristic, but their 
findings are compatible with the suggestion that with respect to AIDS, risk 
perceptions are produced by availability. Precautions against What? 
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•  What accounts for the recent rise of precautionary thinking in Europe? Why have 
certain environmental and health risk achieved so much salience in England, 
France, and the European Union generally? A comprehensive study suggests that 
a few readily available incidents played a large role (Vogel, 2003). In the 1990s, a 
“wave of crises” involving food safety, above all mad cow disease, led to the 
deaths of about one hundred people, with especially large effects on public 
attitudes (Vogel, 2003, p. 568-569). In a tribute to the operation of availability, 
the “regulatory failure associated with BSE significantly affected the attitude of 
the European public toward GM foods” (Vogel, 2003, p. 569). An additional 
“scandal was the apparent failure of French government officials and doctors to 
protect haemopholiacs from blood contaminated with AIDS” virus, in a way that 
had large repercussions for public opinion in France (Vogel, 2003, p. 570-571). 
The conclusion is that differences between European and American policies are 
not a product of deep-rooted cultural differences, but instead have a great deal to 
do with “widespread public perception of regulatory failures,” often based on 
particular, vivid, and widely salient events (Vogel, 2003, p. 580). 
5.3. Availability, climate change, catastrophe, and long-term risks. These points 
have particular implications for risks from climate change that, by their very nature, are 
not likely to cause serious harms in the near future. The problem, a serious one, is that 
such harms will not be cognitively available to citizens, at least not ordinarily. People 
will not “see” those harms until it is too late. In this way, the availability heuristic tends 
to help explain high discount rates, by which people do not take preventive action against 
even serious harms that will not come about for many years. For potentially catastrophic 
risks whose prevention requires long-term investment, there are built-in obstacles to 
serious regulatory efforts. If salient events, such as hurricane activity, can be associated 
with climate change, the likelihood of a response is increased. But for most people most 
of the time, these associations seem speculative. 
A real puzzle, in this light, is not that the United States is relatively unconcerned 
with climate change; it is that European nations are so willing to take action to combat it. 
How do we explain this puzzle? I suggest that the availability heuristic operates as an 
important “input” into a form of intuitive cost-benefit balancing, and that when the Precautions against What? 
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balance favors regulation, people will seek regulatory solutions even if social harms are 
not clearly “available.” The availability heuristic does help people to assess the 
magnitude of a risk; people’s judgments about magnitude are greatly affected by use of 
the availability heuristic. But availability is not the only factor. If the costs of reducing 
the risk are also “on screen,” and if they seem high, then people will not be so 
enthusiastic about extensive precautions. In the United States, intuitive cost-benefit 
balancing, done with the assistance of the availability heuristic, does not clearly support 
significant precautions. For Europe, exactly the opposite is true.  
Of course cost-benefit analysis is often done by technocrats in and out of 
government, usually without close reference to the availability heuristic. But for both 
intuitive and expert practitioners of cost-benefit analysis, the evaluation of global 
warming is very different in the United States from what it is in Europe. 
The crucial point here is that the United States appears to stand to lose much more 
from aggressive regulation than European nation do. For the United States, the likely 
costs of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, seem to exceed its likely benefits, at least on 
the latest numbers (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2003, p. 161). The picture for the world as a 
whole is far more mixed, with Europe anticipated to be a net gainer, and with Russia 
likely to gain an especially large amount (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2003, p. 162). Hence 
those nations that favor aggressive controls on greenhouse gases are responding in large 
part to the fact that they are likely to gain more than they lose. In such circumstances, 
regulation will seem attractive if the risks of climate change are even mildly “available” 
to leaders and citizens. Compare in this regard the assessment of ozone depletion. In the 
end, the United States was highly supportive of extensive precautions, largely because a 
study from the Council of Economic Advisers suggested that the benefits of precautions, 
for Americans, greatly outweighed the costs. The reason for this conclusion is that 
reductions in skin cancer and cataracts, once monetized, suggested that the decreasing 
costs of precaution would be well-justified. Hence President Reagan himself, no 
enthusiast for extensive regulation, strongly supported American involvement in the 
Montreal Protocol.  
If the costs of reducing greenhouse gases were perceived as very low, the 
likelihood of American involvement in precautionary efforts would dramatically Precautions against What? 
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increase; so too if it were generally perceived that the United States had a great deal to 
gain from such reductions. But at the present time, many people believe that the United 
States will be able to handle the costs of climate change, and hence that expensive 
precautions are hard to justify simply from the standpoint of national self-interest. If this 
is so, then intuitive cost-benefit balancing, undertaken without readily available incidents 
of harm, is the source of the official position of the United States; it also helps to explain 
Europe’s greater willingness to engage in precautionary measures. 
Consider the recorded views of Americans about environmental protection and 
climate change in the late 1990s. About 63 percent of Americans agreed with the 
following statement: “Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and 
standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental improvements must be made 
regardless of cost.”
3 In the same general vein, 59 percent supported the Kyoto Treaty on 
global warming, with only 21 percent opposed. But in the same period, 52 percent of 
Americans said that they would refuse to support the Kyoto Treaty on global warming if 
“it would cost an extra $50 per month for an average American household.” In fact only 
11 percent of Americans would support the Kyoto Treaty if the monthly expense were 
$100 or more. How can we explain strong majority support for “environmental 
improvements . . . regardless of cost” and strong majority rejection of environmental 
improvements when the cost is high? The answer lies in the fact that people are not, in 
fact, willing to spend an infinite amount for environmental improvements. When the 
costs are squarely placed “on screen,” people begin to weigh both costs and benefits. 
Surveys in Europe suggests that significant numbers of citizens there are willing to pay a 
considerable amount to reduce the risks of global warming; but even there, the amount is 
not extremely high (Viscusi and Hirsch, 2005). For citizens as well as leaders, intuitive 
assessment of costs and benefits plays a large role in determining the level of precautions 
actually sought. 
But let us simply stipulate (without arguing) that the United States ought to be 
doing more to control greenhouse gases than it is currently willing to do. If so, what can 
be done by way of response? A clue comes from President Bush’s efforts to activate 
                                                 
3 See The Program on International Policy Attitudes, Americans on the Global Warming Treaty, 
available at  
http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/GlobalWarming/glob_warm_treaty.html at Box 15. Precautions against What? 
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public concern about the catastrophic risks associated with terrorism: Conjure up vivid 
images of what might happen when the relevant risks come to fruition. In this way, the 
availability heuristic might be enlisted on behalf of regulatory controls. In connection 
with the Iraq war, the Patriot Act, and many other terrorism-related initiatives, vivid 
images of the Sept. 11 attacks helped to ensure that Americans would be willing to 
“invest” in initiatives that would cost a great deal. Of course it is true that the most 
serious harms associated with climate change are not likely to occur in the near-term, a 
contrast with the risks of terrorism, where a catastrophe could be around the corner.  
This fact makes it difficult to capture people’s attention with vivid images of 
harm—difficult, but not impossible, at least if those images are combined with moral 
appeals (involving obligations to future generations, whose members can be concrete, as 
in, “your children and your grandchildren”) and with efforts to quell fears about the high 
costs of regulatory controls. In other words, availability and salience are a promising way 
of promoting public attention to risks that will not materialize for a long time. If current 
hurricane activity can be associated with climate change, citizens and officials will be 
more likely to favor aggressive action. To see this point, it is necessary to shift from 
individual judgments to social ones. 
 
4. Social Influences 
 
Thus far my emphasis has been on individual cognition. But to say the least, the 
availability heuristic does not operate in a social vacuum. What is readily “available” to 
some individuals, groups, cultures, and nations will not be available to all. In the context 
of climate change, environmentalists, in and out of government, often attempt to focus 
public attention on potentially catastrophic harms. Well-organized private groups play a 
central role in activating public concern. The “social amplification of risk” is a well-
known phenomenon (Pigeon et al., 2003). When social amplification occurs, it is often a 
result of the availability heuristic, operating alongside social processes. 
The question suggests the need to attend to the social and cultural dimensions of 
fear and risk perception. In many cases of high-visibility, low-probability dangers, the 
sources of availability are not obscure. The mass media focus on those risks; people 
communicate their fear and concern to one another; the widespread fact of fear and Precautions against What? 
12 
concern increases media attention; and the spiral continues until people move on. Hence 
the “risk of the month” syndrome, familiar in many societies, stems from the interaction 
between availability and social influences. Much of the time, however, what is available 
and salient to some is not available and salient to all.  
In any case people and cultures have different predispositions. These 
predispositions play a large role in determining which, of the numerous possibilities, is 
salient. Those who are predisposed to believe that most media scares are false or 
trumped-up will find cases in which public fears have been proved baseless. This is an 
example of an individual predispositions, but undoubtedly cultural forces, some deep and 
some less so, help account for differences across nations. Availability helps to determine 
beliefs, to be sure; but beliefs help to determine availability as well. Both beliefs and 
availability are endogenous to one another. When social and cultural forces interact with 
salience, to produce concern about one set of problems but not another, predispositions 
are crucial. Fears about the risks of climate change, and dismissal of those fears, can both 
be explained in this way. It is in this sense that availability can be a product of forces that 
must be explained independently. But let us now turn to how availability spreads. 
 
5. Cascades 
 
Sometimes availability and salience are produced through social bandwagons or 
cascades, in which apparently representative anecdotes and gripping examples move 
rapidly from one person to another (Heath et al., 2001; Heath, 1996). Consider a stylized 
example. Andrew hears of a dangerous event, which he finds to be revealing or 
illustrative. (The event might involve a harmful effect produced by climate change.) 
Andrew tells Barry, who would be inclined to see the event as not terribly informative, 
but who, learning Andrew’s reaction, comes to believe that the event does indeed reveal a 
great deal, and that a serious threat exists. Carol would tend to discount the risk, but once 
she hears the shared opinion of Andrew and Barry, she is frightened as well. Deborah 
will have to have a great deal of private information to reject what has become the shared 
opinion of Andrew, Barry, and Carol (Hirschleifer, 1995, p. 193-194). Stylized though it 
is, the example shows that once several people start to take an example as probative, Precautions against What? 
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many people may come to be influenced by their opinion, giving rise to cascade effects. 
Cultural and even national differences can be explained partly in this way. 
A distinctive feature of social cascades is that the people who participate in them 
are simultaneously amplifying the very social signal by which they are being influenced. 
By their very participation, those who join the cascade increase its size, making it more 
likely that others will join too.  
In the domain of risks and precautions, “availability cascades” are responsible for 
many social beliefs (Kuran and Sunstein, 1999). A salient event, affecting people because 
it is available, tends to be repeated, leading to cascade effects, as the event becomes 
available to increasingly large numbers of people. The point is amplified by the fact that 
fear-inducing accounts, with high emotional valence, are especially likely to spread 
(Heath et al., 2001). There is a general implication here. Because different social 
influences can be found in different communities, local variations are inevitable, with 
different examples becoming salient in each. Hence such variations—between say 
England and the United States, or between Germany and France—might involve 
coincidence or small or random factors, rather than large-scale cultural differences. 
Different judgments within different social groups, with different “available” examples, 
owe their origin to social processes of this sort. Return to my epigraph: “Many Germans 
believe that drinking water after eating cherries is deadly; they also believe that putting 
ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The English, however, rather enjoy a cold drink of water 
after some cherries; and Americans love icy refreshments” (Henrich et al., 2001, p. 353-
354). 
 
6. Group Polarization 
 
There is a closely related phenomenon. When like-minded people deliberate with 
one another, they typically end up accepting a more extreme version of the views with 
which they began (Sunstein, 2003b). This is the process known as group polarization. 
Consider a few examples: 
 
•  After discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the United States and 
its intentions with respect to economic aid (Brown, 1985, p. 224).  Precautions against What? 
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•  A group of moderately profeminist women becomes more strongly profeminist 
after discussion (Myers, 1975). 
•  After discussion, whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more negative 
responses to the question whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced 
by African-Americans in American cities (Myers and Bishop, 1971).  
•  After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice offer more 
positive responses to the same question, that is, they are more likely to find white 
prejudice to be the source of conditions faced by African-Americans in American 
cities (Myers and Bishop, 1971). 
•  Juries inclined to award punitive damages typically produce awards that are 
significantly higher than the awards chosen, before deliberation, by their median 
member (Sunstein et al., 2002). 
Group polarization will inevitably occur in the context of perceptions of risk; and 
hence group polarization helps to account for cultural and even national differences. If 
several people fear climate change, and speak to one another, their fear is likely to 
increase as a result of internal discussions. If some groups seem hysterical about certain 
risks, and other groups treat those risks as nonexistent, group polarization is likely to be a 
reason. Hence group polarization provides another explanation for the different fears of 
groups, localities, and even nations.   
Group polarization undoubtedly occurs in connection with climate change; 
indeed, it helps explain cross-cultural differences. An initial predisposition toward fear is 
likely to be aggravated as a result of collective deliberations. Within groups, a tendency 
toward fear or neglect breeds its own amplification. In the United States, group 
polarization has played a large role within groups concerned or less concerned about 
climate change. Those who believe that the risks are trivial, or not worth addressing, 
often speak largely with one another, intensifying their antecedent belief. 
 
7. Media, Interest Groups, and Politicians 
 
It should be clear that in the real world, some voices are more important than 
others, especially when availability and salience are involved. In particular, the behavior 
and preoccupations of the media play a large role. Knowing the importance of media Precautions against What? 
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coverage, well-organized private groups work extremely hard to promote public attention 
to particular risks. Some of these groups are altruistic; others are entirely self-interested.  
The common tactic is to publicize an incident that might trigger both availability 
and salience. Showing at least a working knowledge of the availability heuristic, private 
groups seize on selected incidents, even ones expected to occur in the future, and 
publicize them to make them generally salient to the public. In all of these examples, the 
use of particular instances might be necessary to move the public, and legislatures, in the 
right directions. Certainly the social processes that interact with salience and availability 
can promote reform where it is needed.  
Politicians engage in the same basic project. By its very nature, the voice of an 
influential politician comes with amplifiers. When public officials bring an incident 
before the public, a seemingly illustrative example is likely to spread far and wide. A 
legal enactment can itself promote availability; if the law responds to the problems 
associated with climate change, people might well come to see those problems as readily 
available. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 would inevitably loom large no 
matter what President George W. Bush chose to emphasize. But the President, and his 
White House generally, referred to the attacks on countless occasions, frequently as a 
way of emphasizing the reality of seemingly distant threats and the need to incur 
significant costs to counteract them (including the 2003 Iraq war, itself fueled by 
presidential speeches including vivid narratives of catastrophic harm). And there is no 
doubt that the salience of these attacks played a large role in affecting political 
behavior—and that this role cannot be understood without reference to social influences. 
The implications for cultural differences and for climate change should be clear. If 
leaders in different nations draw attention to different risks, there will be large-scale 
differences in risk perceptions. 
 
8. Predispositions and Culture 
 
But all this does not provide the full picture. Beliefs and orientations are a product 
of availability, and social influences ensure both availability and salience. But as I have 
suggested, what is available is also a product of antecedent beliefs and orientations, both Precautions against What? 
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individual and social. In other words, availability is endogenous to, or a product of, 
predispositions, individual, cultural, and national.
4  
Why do some people recall and emphasize incidents in which a failure to take 
precautions led to serious environmental harm? A likely reason is that they are 
predisposed to favor environmental protection. And why do some people recall and 
emphasize incidents in which environmental protection led to huge costs for little gain? A 
likely reason is that they are predisposed to oppose environmental controls. Here is an 
interaction between the availability heuristic and confirmation bias—”the tendency to 
seek information to confirm our original hypotheses and beliefs” (Aronson, 1995, p. 150). 
Confirmation bias plays a large role in different risk perceptions across individuals and 
groups. If members of a culturally distinct group are predisposed to believe that climate 
change contains serious risks, apparently supportive illustrations will be memorable, and 
contrary ones will be discounted. 
Of course predispositions are not a black box, and they do not come from the sky. 
They have sources. Among their sources are availability and salience. After incidents of 
mad cow disease in England, many Europeans lost trust in the relevant authorities and 
acquired a predisposition to fear, and to take and urge precautions against, associated and 
analogous threats. In Europe, the growth of precautionary thinking, across certain 
domains, had a great deal to do with particular salient incidents (Vogel, 2003). The desire 
to combat climate change was spurred in this way. Hence there is complex set of 
interactions, with heuristics helping to constitute predispositions, which are in turn 
responsible for the real-world operation of heuristics. All this happens socially, not 
merely individually; and predispositions are not static. When people are in a group that is 
predisposed in a particular direction, the salient examples will be quite different from 
those that are salient in a group with an opposite predisposition. Here group polarization 
is especially important. What is sometimes described as “culture,” or as “deep-rooted 
cultural differences,” may be no such thing. Cascade effects and polarization, interacting 
with availability, can be responsible for inclinations and variations that might well have 
taken another form. 
                                                 
4 On culture, an influential treatment is Douglas and Wildavsky (1984); a natural reading of their work 
and the work of those inspired by them is that availability is a product of cultural orientations, rather than 
vice versa. But see Vogel (2003) for a contrasting view. Precautions against What? 
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9. Conclusion 
 
Why are some groups and some nations concerned with the risks associated with 
climate change, and why are others much less so? A sensible default assumption is that 
they are motivated by a form of intuitive cost-benefit balancing. Nations usually follow 
their rational self-interest, and a nation that has relatively less to gain from precautions, 
and relatively more to lose, will naturally be interested in greater precautions. Contrast 
here the enthusiasm of the United States for precautionary steps to reduce ozone 
depletion with the reluctance of the United to endorse such steps to reduce global 
warming. The difference has a great deal to do with that nation’s assessment of the costs 
and benefits of precautions. 
I have also suggested that the operation of the Precautionary Principle, and 
differences in risk perception among nations, have a great deal to do with the availability 
heuristic, which helps to inform intuitive cost-benefit balancing. For the risks associated 
with climate change, which are not likely to come to fruition in the near future, it is 
difficult to promote availability; but vivid images are possible to provide here as well. 
European nations are more concerned about climate change than the United States in part 
because certain environmental risks have become more salient in the former than in the 
later, and in part because both intuitive and formal cost-benefit analysis suggest that with 
expensive preventive measures, the United States is more likely to be a net loser. If that 
analysis shifted, through declining costs of control or through more vivid incidents of 
tangible harm, American participation in international agreements would be far more 
probable.  
Of course availability is a product of social influences. Cascade effects and group 
polarization play substantial roles in making one or another incident available to many or 
most. There are multiple equilibria here: Single incidents and small shocks can make an 
extraordinary difference. Moreover, what is available to some will not be available to all, 
in part because of social influences, and in part because of individual, cultural, and 
national predispositions. It follows that some cultures will find risks of climate change 
“available” not because of simple facts about what citizens have to gain and to lose, but 
also because the relevant citizens are predisposed to focus on some risks but not on 
others. But even across cultural differences, intuitive cost-benefit balancing can be Precautions against What? 
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altered by available incidents; if vivid incidents become salient, aggressive regulation is 
far more likely to be forthcoming. 
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